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When I think of Rocky Mountain College, I think not

.0

much of

your outstanding President, your excellent faculty, your .pa.ciou. ground..,

I'

I
I

your fine reputation, or your student body, but of a young mAn whom I met

1

years ago on my !tret vie it to thia campus.

i
I

1

I

I

Hia nAme walll Dennis Casey. He ca.me .from Lewi.town. Montana.

!I

He

I'
I

the leader of the Rocky Mountain College Marchtng Band., which

wa.8

•

•

numbered thirteen on that oecadon. a band which escorted me from the gate

I
I

I

to the college.

I

1 wa. very proud on that oceallion to be a.corted by the

I

nucleus of what later became a bigg er .. but not better .. marching band, And

, I

I
I

I

very pleased to make the acquaintance of, and to be friend. with, Dennb Cuey.

Since tb.a.t time I have v1eited your c&mpU8 on .. number of oeca.lon.

I

I

I

and every time 1 come here I think of Dennis Casey, who laid down his life

1

I

I

in Vietnam, 8.nd who represented so much of what wa.s good in Montana and our

•
•

Republic.

1
To me Dennis Casey is the symbol of all t:ha.t is good, fine, a.nd

outetanding tn tbta ln8tttution, II.nd when 1 spea.k of Dennb , Casey, 1 a.m apeakt.ng of ,

your President, your faculty, II.nd your student body.

I

He wa. a good man, he

was a decent man, and 1 valued hill friendship more than 1 can put into worda.
So, to 8. fonner atudent and a friend, may I, with your permission,

!

I

·•
"

I ,

I iI

dedicate this Commencement Address to Dennis Casey a.a well aa to the Claaa

!j.

of 1972?
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CHINA:

A NEW RELATIONSHIP

Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana

Monday , May 29, 1972, 9 :30 a.m., M.S . T.

I would like to share with you on this day which is
of g reat importance to you some thoughts of world affairs.

One

aspect of this subject, in particular, begs for your understanding

and attention.
and China.

That is the re lationship between the United States

It is uppermost in my mind, at this time, because I

have only this month returned from a j ourney to Peking.

The

i mpressions of the visit to that capital and several othe r Chinese
cities are still very vivid.

So, too, are my discuss ions with

leaders of the Peoplels Republic.
This is a notable year in U.S.-China relati ons .

The

first sign ificant steps in 25 years have been taken towards a
general rev ision of dealings with Chlna.

The initiative was

long overdue and, hence the backlog of unfinished bUSiness is
very heavy.
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Almost a quarter of a century ago, we cut ourselves
off, as a matter of deliberate policy, from all normal re lations
with the largest nation on ea rth.

We did so by misreading or

distorting, in an official sense J the implicat i ons of the Chinese
revolution which brought a new government to Pe king in 1949 .
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense that the People's
Republic of China did not exist .

Even as we pretended it was not

there, we invested heavily in an elaborate system of costly constraints to curtail that government .
The price of this detachment fr om reality was not
trivial .

Quite apart from billions spent fo r counterpoises to

China throughout ASia, our present involvement in Viet Nam can
be considered, in large measure, to be part of the price of this
constra i nt.

So, too, was our earlier involvement in Korea.

These and other military actions were undertaken in the
name of a policy called "containment" which was based on a set of
assumptions about the nature of events in China, as we guessed or

- 3 -

persuaded ourselves to bel ieve them to be.

These assumpt ions were

made i n a vacuum because of our isolation from the Chinese mainland.
Not surprisingly, many of them turned out t o be highly inaccurate.
The tragic cost of the miscalculations can be stated
in terms of the lives lost, the bodies maimed and the res ources
squandered all around the r imlands of As ia , particularly in Korea
and Indoch i na.

To be sure, we cannot estimate what the alternative

costs might have been had we acted on more accurate assumptions,
or had we taken no action at all .

Simply on the basis of what

did happen, however, history may well record these miscalculations
regard ing China, as among the most costly of all time.
I might say, parenthetically, that we are at a crucial
point, at the present time, in determining whether we will persist
in this mistaken course .
the past few weeks.

I refer to events i n Viet Nam during

The new U. S. air and sea actions are vestigial

responses whi ch arise from the old, not the new China policy whi ch

- 4 -

was signaled by the Presidentts visit to Peking .

Whatever the

success of these new war measures, they will not alter in any
way the overwhelming need of this nation to disengage completely
from the Indochina conflict.

We need to do so, not to satisfy

Hanoi or Peking or Moscow, but in order to serve our own national
interests.

If we have learned anything to date from this conflict,

it is that we have no national stake in that conflict except an

end to further casualties and the return of the orlsoners of war
and the missing in action.

The course o f action best calculated

to serve these national needs remains to negotiate the best polltical solution without further recourse to arms and to get out of
Indochina, lock, stock and barrel.
But, to return to the central theme of my remarks, it
is reveal ing to ask ourselves how we became involved i n Viet Nam
in the first place.

How did we permit ourselves to make such

faulty commitments wi th such disastrous consequences?

We get

- 5 -

some clues, I think, when we review the spectrum of our relationship with China over the last two centuries.
More than with other nations, ou r relationship with
China has been subject t J the ebb and flow of popular myth.

We

have tended to oscillate from one ove rs i mplif ied view of China
to another.

For almost two centuries, China has been viewed ,

alternately, as benign or virulent, frlendly or host i le, wise
or foolish.
Like the tt yin ll and l1yang" of Chinese cosmology which
holds that life 1s the product of a dualism of opposites , our
image of China has gone from one extreme to the other.

On the

one hand, there has been the image of the China of wi sdom, intel ligence, indust ry, piety, stoicism and strength.

That is the

benign China of Marco Polo and Pearl S . Buck; it is the China of
the Charlie Chan movies and of the
to J apan in the 1930's.

st~ries

of heroic res istance

- 6 On the other hand, there has been the image of the
China o f cruelty , barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes .
This is the China of drum - head tr ials , opium dens , bandits,

summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxe r Rebellion .
In the late 18th centur y, we looked up to China as an
ancient civiJ.ization-- superior in many aspects of

techn~logy,

culture, and social order and surrounded by an air of solendid
and imperial mystery .

In that period, the China trade was sought

eagerly by the Clipper ships and Chinese pr oduce was highly valued
notably along the Eastern Seaboard and in Europe .
Respect turned to contempt , ho wever, with Chinals
quick de f eat in the Opium War of 1840 .

There followed acts of

humiliation of China such as our participation in extra- territorial
treaty rights and the Chinese Exclusion Act
the 19th century .

~f

the last half of

- 7 In theearly 20th century, attitudes shifted agai n
benevolence.

t~

American missionaries of many fa i ths made China

a favored field for pr oselyt izing and educat ion.

In this period,

the Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people .

Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 1937
produced another shift from benevolence to admiration.
end of the Sec ond World War, admiration

,",'8S

displaced

At the
by

dis -

appointment and frustation, as the wart ime truce between Nationa li st
and Communist forces collapsed in internal strife .

This nation

became profoundly disenchanted with China , a disenchantment which
was replaced abruptly i n 1949 by hostility .

U. S. Secretaries of

State turned their backs on Chinese leaders and spoke of the menace
of "Chinese hordes ll as predecessors had spoken wi th similar revulsion of the "Yellow peril.

II

- 8 The hostility was largely a react io n, of c ourse, to
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chi nese mainland .

We were not only dl smayed by th i s development, we saw it almost
as a national affront.

Peking was viewed as a treacherous ex-

tension of the Soviet steamroller wh i ch had reduced Eastern and
Central Europe to subservience at the end of World War II.

China

became in our eyes the Eastern puppet o f world communism, to be
manipulated by strings pulled i n Moscow.

After Chi nese f o rces intervened 1n the war in Korea
where, i ncidentally, Mao Tse-tung lost hi s eldest son, U. S .
policy was cast anew on the premise that the government on the

Chlnese mainland was an aggressor.

It was seen as ready to use

force to impose international Communism anywhere i n Asia.

Con-

versely, it was assumed that if the endorsement of the free nations
were withheld, th i s reg i me wh ich was sa i d to be
Chinese people woul d wither and collapse.

!1

a l ien ll to the

- 9 -

On this premise, it was rationalized that recognition
must not be extended to Peki ng.

Instead, the officia l American

view was that the Chi nese Nat ional Government, whic h had retreated
t o the i sland of Taiwan, continued t o speak f or all of China.

We

cut off trade with the Chinese mainland and di d whatever could be
done to encourage other countr i es t o follow suit .

In a similar

fash50n, a diplomatic campaign was conducted year after year
against the seating of the Chinese Peopl e's Republic i n the Unit ed
Nations.
We drew an arc of milita ry alliances on t he seaward

side of Ch i na a nd undergirded them with the deployment of mass iv e
U. S. mi litary power in bases throughout the Western Pacifi c.
of billions of dollars were expended in this process.

Tens

Much of

this immense outpour i ng of effo rt and money seems i ncred ible now
in the light of the Pres i dent's recent Vi sits to Peking and t o
Moscow.

Yet, i t has cont i nued fo r 20 years a nd, of course, is

still going on, notably, in Indoc hina .

-

10 -

As has been suggested, this last quarter century of
China policy has been characterized by delusion and miscalculation.

We assumed, for example, that the Chinese Communists would be unable
to govern .

We assumed that the Peking government would be an ex-

tension of Soviet Communism and a willing accomplice to Soviet
purpose and design .

And we assumed that the Chinese government

would be bent on territorial aggrandizement .
All of these assumptions have proved to be erroneous.
In the first place, of the numerous divisions wh ich have arisen

within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow and
Peking have been the most significant .

They so remain today

although the rasp ing edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered
by the periodic flare -u ps of the war in Viet Nam .
At the same time, the government of the People's Republic
has not only survived, it has provided the Chinese people with
effective leade rsh ip .

Chi nese society has achieved a considerable

- 11 -

degree of economic, scientific and social pr ogress,

A modern

technology has been developed wh ich is sophisticated enough to
turn

o~

products ranging from needles and hand - tools to thermo-

nuclear devices, earth satellites and the rockets to place them
in orbit .

A powerful national momentum has been generated which

is proving sufficient to supply an enormous population with the

wherewithal of decent survival and an imp rov ing livelihood.
Notwithstanding assumptions to the contrary, the Chinese
gove rnment has not shown any great eagerness to use its own armed
forces to spread its contr ol abroad .

Where Chinese armies have

been employed they have been used to assert traditional territorial
claims, or in expression of concern for the safety of China's
borders.
ventures.

China has not become enmeshed in foreign military ad In Viet Nam, for example, the Chinese military involve -

ment has been peripheral.

There is Chinese equipment i n South

Viet Nam but there are no Chinese battal ions.

In North Viet Nam

- 12 -

reports have i nd icated the presence , from time to t ime , not of
Chinese combat units, but of la bo r troops engaged in repa i ring
b~mb

damage to r oads, railroads, br i dges and the like .
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan

frontier with India, are often cited as examples of militant
Commun ist aggression.

Neverthe l ess, for

centur ~. es,

Tibet has

been un ive rsa lly regarded as falling within China's ove r-all
boundar ies .

If the Pek i ng government claims that Tibet belongs

to Ch nB, so, too, does the Chinese Nat i onal Government on Taiwan .
India also acknowledges such to be the case and American policy
has never officially recognized Tibet as other than Chinese
territory .
Even in Ko r ea, the direct Chinese military involvement
did not begin until United Nat Ions forces approached Ch i nars
borders.

In any

Korea years ago .

event~

the last Chinese batallions left North

- 13 Looking ahead, it would seem to me that Chinese energies
and res ources are going to be

S~

preempted by internal needs over

the next two decades that there is little likelihood that Ch ina
could post a serious military danger to the United States even if
that were the inclination .
The evidence, in short, is ample to dispel some of the
most alarming assumptions on wh i ch Qur past policies have been
based .

Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China.

There is also an immense potential danger i n every other powerful
nat ~o n

in a

w~rld

wh i ch has not yet l earned how to maintain

c i vilized surv i val in a nuc l ear age except on the raz or's edge.
Ins ofar as Ch i na is concerned, the fundamenta l question for us
is not so much whether i t is a danger, but whether our policies
will act to alleviate or to exacerbate the danger.

- 14 -

In my judgment , these policies can alleviate the danger
only to the extent that they are based on premises that correspond
more near ly to real ities than has been the case in the past .
will serve no useful purpose to flail at windmills.
have, in 1972, at last penetrated the shroud of

It

Now that we

~bscurity

surround-

l ng China, there is reason to hope that our judgments and actions
regard ing China and As ia , henceforth, '\'Iill be better informed .

In this new phase of our relat ions with China, we must
beYlare, of course, that the old pendulum of myth does not now

swing to the other extreme, thereby creating a new image of China
which is as unreal as the old.

We must guard against becoming too

enamoured of the splendors of a newly revived amity.

Banquets

and toasts and shark's fin soup do no t of themselves assure a new
order of world affairs.
To keep the pendulum in equilibrium in our current approach to China, it would be well to heed a rule laid down by

- 15 Lord

Palmerst~n,

the prime Min i ster of Great Britain in the

1860's, who dec la red:
"We have no eternal allies, and we

have no perpetual enemies.

"

Our experiences in postwar Wor l d War II re13t ions with Germany
and Japan underscore this observation.
We have not alwa ys been very astute about defining
where our real i nterests lie .

We have often tended to confuse

them with fleeting and transitory i mages of fr i endl i ness or
animosity.

Th is i s all too true i n the case of China where, for

25 years, we have been obsessed wi th the assumed threat of a perpetua l enemy .

In fact, we might well have avoided the untold

misery and loss of life and res ources of the per i phera l war i n
Indochina, had we forgone the poses of power and, instead, taken
a harder view of our nat ional i nterests .

- 16 While we cannot i dent ify national interests with exactitude, we do have it within our means
where it is that they do not lie.
in this connection .

t~

determine much more clearly

The President has shown the way

Even before his visit to Peking, he had laid

the groundwork for reestablish ing more normal contact with the
People 1 s Republic of China by the removal of discriminatory restriction on travel of Americans to the Chinese mainland and by ending
the embargo on trade with China.

The embargo had been imposed

during the Korean War and was of a design so tight as
even chop -st icks .
had had

n~

t~

exclude

The fact 1s, however, that for two decades, it

economic impact on China and had served only to injure

our own traders .

By ending the boycott on the eve of his visit

China
to China, the PreSident removed what was, at most, an irritant to I
but which would have hampered his efforts to bring about the
beginnings of a re conciliation .
As it was, Pres ident Nixon was able to lay the groundwork
for the growth of contact betwe en the t wo nations .

The chances

- 17 are good that the months and years ahead will see a gradual increase
in exchanges between Ch i na and the United States in med icine and
health, science, journalism, athletics, the arts and other pursuits.

An i ncrease in trade i s also to be anticipated.

The

Chinese are i n an excellent pos ition to move forward in this connecticn .

It has been their practice to

wide, in r ough balance .
debt .

kee~

imports and exports, world -

They have neither external nor internal

They have ample exchange reserves.

The i r international re-

putation for integr i ty and reliabi lity in commercial transations

is already very good .

A great range of Chinese products is avail-

able for s ale in the world markets and the Chinese also have a
substant ial shopping list for i mports wh ic h will he lp to speed
their own development and strengthen their economiC self- reliance .
Exc hanges can take place, in my judgment, even though
the issue of Taiwan remains, f i nal l y, t o be r es olved.

Presi dent

Nixon has acknowledged as valid, Peking's claim that the island

- 13 is part of China.

That claim, incidentally, is s u stained by the

Chinese government on Taiwan.

With the assurance that the United

States will not pursue a two-China policy, Pekjng is prepared to
go ahead jn re e stab'ishing contact w'th this natiJn while exploring
in its own fashion the road to reunif "cat t on of the island with

the mainland .
Beyond exchanges between China and the United States,
there loom larger questions of peace and security in the Western
Pacific .

Even as we meet here today, weawait the

consequences

of the latest escalat j. on of the U. S. involvement in Viet Nam as

well as the full import of the Pres i dent's discuss l ons in Moscow.
One can only h'' Jpe that we have seen the last resort to retaliation

in Indochina, the final burst of this wasting conflict and that
progress can now be expected toward a genuine politica l settlement .
In all candor, the rec ord of this tragic war provides
little grounds f:)r optimism in thls respe ct .
Cambodia did not produce peace .

The invasion of

Nor did the invasion of Laos .

Nor did the earlier bombing enterpr ises over North Vlet Nam .

- 19 Peace was the promise attached, i n turn, t o each of
these esca l at iJns of the U. S. i nvolvement.

Each, in turn, led

not t o the pr omised peace but t o ... more ki lled and maimed, more
prisoners of war, more miss i ng in act Lon, more and more billions
i n expend i tures t o produce more and more devastat i on throughout
Indochina.
The end of this war ha s yet to come and i t i s not clear
yet when i t will come.

We wou1d do we ll , nevertheless, to beg i n

t o exami ne t he pos s i bi l i t i es of a new s ecur i ty system, based on
the r eal :t ie s of the 70's .

Those rea lit i es urge us to see k, in

my judgment, an equ i librium of th i s nat ion ' s i nterests with those
of Ch i na, J a pan, the Sov i et Un i on and the smaller nations of the
Western Pac i f i c.

All have a stake i n the peace of the region .

The restorat ion of contact wi th Chi na furthers the
poss i bi lity t ha t at s ome t i me tr i part i te di scuss i ons might be
held between Ch i na, J a pan, and the Un i ted States, i f not quadr i partite talks, wh i ch would also include the Soviet Uni on.

A

- 28 -

development of this kind could do much to allay unfounded mutual
fears and to begin to come to grips with the question of adjustment
of valid nat ional interests .

It could provide i ns ights into such

vital quest iJns as the intentions of the var io us powers i n the
Western Pac ific and how they relate to one another, the economic
needs of the Asian nations, and the prospects for curbing nuclear
conflict .

Most

~m portant}

such d iscuss · ons might provide a veh icle

for general stabilization of the Indochina peninsula and Southeast

Asia in the pos t - war era .
Adjustments of th i s kind requ i re fresh perspectives.
We need t o see the s ituat i on as it is today, ndas it appeared 20
years ago in the cataclysmic upheaval of the Chi nese revolution .
We need to see the s i tuation no t th r ough the fog of an old and
stagnant host :lity but i n the light of the endur i ng interests of
the United States i n the Western Pac ift c wh i ch a re no less than a
peace of equality and mutualit y wh i ch will perm it a flower j ng of
relations with all As ia n nations .
more.

Nor, may I add, are they any

- 21 -

I see great relevance in young men and women thinking
deeply of the issues

wh~ch d~vtde

determine how they can be recast

China and the United States to
in new and uncluttered molds.

Unlike my generation, you have already learned much about Asia.
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and
of

t~

the world .

nati~nal

Furthermore, you have not had the experience

trauma in moving abruptly from an era marked by an

almost fawn'ng benevolence toward China to one of thorough disenchantment.

You were spared the fierce hostilities which rent

this nat ion i nternally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and security
regarding China gave way to feelings of

revu~sion,

hatred and 1n-

security ,
You young Americans and y::mr counterparts in China wi..ll
l1ve your adult years in an era in wh'ch much of the world's
h'story wil' be \oJritten 1n the Pacif';'c,

Wh:J.t y'Ju d'1, how

Y0U

relate to one another--Chinese and Americans --will have much to
do with whether or not that h'story is written in terms of peace
and civilized human survjval .

- 22 -

I have seen Chlna off and on since I served there in the
Marines in the 192:]ls.

I have seen you, your parents and your

grandparents much closer up and for a much longer period of time .
I am confident about a future that belongs to your
generati~n,

b~th

in China and in this

c~unt r y

of ours .

This

Republic is worthy of your best efforts not only in terms of
developing Chinese and U. S. re!ati ::ms, but w'th regard to the
entire world .

You can do no more than try to achieve mutual

understanding and a peace with all peoples .
do no less .

You can and should
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China are

We are beginni ng, at last, to see what really

confronts us in the great nation on the other s i de of the globe.
I would like

t~

talk t o you, therefore, about myths

and realities regarding China.
our relat lons

w ~ th

I do s o becaule what happens in

that nat ion Mil l have profound mean i ng to you

throughout your adult l i ves .

A few weeks ago, I had the experi ence

of spending 16 days traveli ng in Chi na.

It waa not my f i rst vis i t

but it was in 1946 that I had la8t been there.

So for a quarter

of a century, that vaat land has been to me al i t has been t o
almost all Amer i cana,

88

remote

88

the moon.

In fact, Si nce the

apace program began, we have spent more time and energy--and much
more of the federal trea8ury--thousands of t i mes more-- i n attempt i ng
to fathom the moon's secreta than i n trying to learn the truth
about China.

COpy

Since 1949, our concept. of China have been compounded
of ignorance, half truth and untruth.

This cJncoctlon produced

a U. S. policy wh'ch was designed on the balls of a China seen
as a malignant dragon breathing tire and laahing out aggressively

at the world.
Before most of you who are graduating were born, your
government had already begun to erect a Great Wall of
against thIs presumed menace.

A rIng of military treaties waa

establi.hed in Asia to choke off what were thought
imperial ambItions .

tsolatl~n

t~

be China's

To nail these treatue8 into place, moreover,

U. S. bases were established allover that region.
were sent to man the bases.

U. S. troops

Tens of b1llions of dollars 1n mll1-

tary aid were distributed among roreign governments who dld not
have to do much more to obtain Buch aid than to give us assurances

of the1r hostility to Communism.
While we were seeing China &s a recklea., belligerent

and powerful ally of Communist Russia, China was struggling to

build on the rui ns of World War II and a great revo lut ion, a
poli tical and economic system which would serve the needs o f the
Chinese people .

If we Bought to conta i n Chi na, in turn, the

Ch1nese oought t o keep u. from 1nterferi ng i n hei r affa i r ••

The

Chi ne.e vi ew of U. S. pol i cy In those days was that it wa. a
10gl cal extens i on of the over-all Western effort t o

d~ inate

exploit the1r country wh l ch had per. i oted fo r 150 years.

and

They

saw us as implacable enemies.
If the Chinese dl d not read our i ntent ions correctly,

we d1d not read the i r> any more accurately.

The fact i 8 that

China did not engage i n aggres8 i ve se i zures of ne i ghbor Ing nat ions.

Whatever terri tor1al change. they have . ought, wit h the Sovi et
Union, Burma and India, had a180 previously been those pursued by
predecessor Chi nese g overnments, notabl y the government o f Chiang

Kai-8hek on Taiwan.

In retrospect, U. S.

p~licy

with regard to China slnce

1949 has been ill-informed and mis-guided.
Monday morning quarter-back.

I 8ay that not as a

All of us who lived through those

years share, to Borne degree, the writing ot this unfortunate

chapter in U. S . -Chinese relations.
fears get the beat of

U8 .

The tact 1. that we let our

In look1.ng at Chl na for the past two

decades, we saw much that waa not "there.

It 1s st1ll d1fficult even now to t rm 1mpresaions of
China free of theae paat distortions.

Nevertheless, the diator-

tiona can be tempered by perspective in the senae that a bjttle

can be judged aa half full or aa half empty .

If China is measured

by some of our common yard.ticks, whether they be highway mileage,
the number of C4rs, television aet., kitchen gadget.,

p~lltlc&l

parties, or new.paper ed'tors--the bottle wl11 be seen as half

empty.

If China i8 viewed in the light of it. own paat, the bottle

i. half full and rapidly filling .

That i8 the way the Chinese people look at their situation.
They are not comparing their way
or even Taiwan'l.

o~

life with ours or with India's

They are looking inward at where they were

yesterday, where they are today and where they will be tomlrr?w.
It 18 no wonder, then, that there are many signa of popular BC-

ceptance ot the new China and very little to indicate popular
discontent.

The fact is that the contrast of the new China with

the old ia nothing ahort

t extraordinary.

It the new Ch na 18 a closely controlled lociety, it is
allo true that political freedom was not a preemlnant characteristic

of the old Chtna.
and the new.

Yet, there are Iharp contraats between the old

Unlike the past, the current political controls have

resulted in a China free of the ever-present threat>f famine,
pestilence, flood and other calamities.

It is also a China largely

free of exploitation, tree ot polittcal corruption and free ot indifferent government.

Dy comparisJn with the past, there i. evary vis1ble
indication that the Chinese people, today, live jn a well-fed,
adequately clothed and housed, and reasonably healthy society.
The cities are clean, orderly and sate.

The shops are well

stocked with tood, clothing and modest conaumer items.

Crime,

b'gglng, drug addict ion, alcohol lam, del1.nquenLY are conspicuous
in theIr absence .
Personal integrity 18 Icrupuloul to an extreme.

In

Canton, for example, I saw a display case for lost nnd found
articles 1n the lobby of the People'. Hotel.

It c ontalned, among

other thing., a half-empty package of c t garettel and a pencil!
Today'8 China 1s an effectively organized, hard-working,

early-to-bed, early-to-rise society.

In both urban and rural sreas,

the people appear to be well motivated and cooperat ive.
men work side by stde for equal pay.

Women and

There 1s no visible disttnc-

ticn of rank on the farms, 1n the factcrles, in the armed services
or government offices .

A casual sense of freedom and Mutual
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tolerance prevades personal relationships.
easy egalitarianism.

There is an air of

There 1s no bOKlng d:'>wn or kowtowing, not

even to the hIghest officials .

The accent in China 1s on today and tomorrow, but
interest 1s also evidenced in China's rich past.

8

new

Everywhere there

are striking restorations of cultural shrines even as the search
cJnttnues for more of the 3nclent herltage.

Excavations of the

historic sites are underway throughout China and the archeological
flnds, to date, have been very impressive .

Conservation of natural resources has also received
great emphasis.

So many trees have been planted In and around

PekIng, for example, that the local weather has been altered for
the better.

Throughout China a new productivity is being developed

by the reclamation of wastelands and by mass've water c3ntrol

projects .
Only a feil years ago, no medical care to speak. of was
available to the great preponderance of Chtna's people .

Now,

along w1th. regular physicians, Bo-called It barefoot ll doctors who,

in the tens of thjusands, constitute a kind of basic civilian
medlca] corps, are active in every reg ton of Ch1na .
wh

~h

The help

they g!ve is often based on a lLnlted medical knJvledge

but it 1s sustained by an unlimited enthusiasm to serve the s1ck .
Along with modern medicine J the Ch1neae are allJ using
tr~d'ttonAl

herb treatment and accupuncture techniques.

The

latter 1s a Chinese heallng practice wh\ch 1s over three thousand
years old.

It h!s been revived as a hlably effectlve anathe.ia

in surgery and is also betng
as a treatment

t~r

p~t

t

widespread experimental use

Many ailments.

IntestInal and

~ther

epidemic dlaeaS8s--the terrors Jf

old Chtna- - have been drastically reduced or eliminated.

heavy accent whIch

h~5

The

been placed In personal cleanllness and

'jrder h'18 been a major fact'jr in th s nch'.evement.

In add

t~.,:>nJ

there have been repeated mobilizations of the population in mass

campaigns to eradicate disease-carrying snails J flies and mosqutto8a .

Bot only In health bOlt In every aspect of society there l.
eVidence of

3

Ch n. being rebuilt,

The Chlneae people have swept

away much )f the Inequity, the ineffectiveness and the despair ot

the paat.
Notwl.thatandlng report. to the contrary. the fa.",ny
remains

88

the baslc 80c181 unit of China.

It 18 a

tL~ltJ

however,

whICh Is no longer permitted t> function on the .ole b'sis of
family Intereata. Indifferent to the fate of the community and the

nat· on.

In short, the Chtnese are falhlonlng a modern society,

with a way of life wh ch i. rooted In the past but meet. the needa
of the present, and seems to offer

h~pe

t~r

While these vast Change. hove been
Chln~.

we have gone on fighting a w.r In

ment In that w.r i. derived In large
China wh'ch were adopted in 1)4).
80me yeara ago.
another reality:

p~rt

the future.
ta~ing

In~?chln..

rr,~

place in
Our Inv,lve-

the policies toward.

A. a former Pre.ldent put it

'Over thl. war (in Indochina). and all Asia i.
The deepening .hadow of Communist Chins. "

To

say 1t another way, we had engaged ourselves 1n Indochina, in
major part, t o block an aggre •• l ve China.

Por all practical

purposes, President Klxon no longer aee8 the e l tuation that way.
On his vie i t he f ound a Ch nB not turned outward f or aggresaive
ends but & Ch i na i ntent on

sol~1ng

1ts many internal problema.

He ini t i ated furtner contact on tne ba.1. of th t . finding.
The fact 1_ that the Ch 1 ne_e, them.elvea, reject the
status ot Illuper_power

and insiat that thei r aystem doee not

permit thea to impose the 1r vi ewa on othere by f orce.

Thei r

armed t orcea are maintained i n.i de Chi na'a borders and there are
no appeals tor mil i tary crusades abroad .

They have no military

outposts or bases in Korea, Southeaat Al i a or anywhere else on
the As l an continent.
In a book written atter a recent vt s l t to China, Ross
Terrtll summed up the Chi nese view of the world tn these words:
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"Here is a Buoeril)r people . . . but
wh~se

sense

~f

their superiority is

r~oted

in

contentm.ent with their own Yft")untatns and r t vers-not an active sense of 8uperiority wh eh pants to
convert the

w~rld

to ita excellence.

A passive

Benle of superior! ty, wh en basks, tnward-turned,
l

w1. thtn t ts own possessed excellence. "

There 1s little rea.on to expect a radical change 1n
the basic dIrection

China'. present course.

Mao TBe-tung has

becOllle a Hving legend 1.n Chin" and hl a writlnga are

alre~dy

Hkely

~f

t~

ec~nomic

illumiMte the path of Ch 1na'a SOCial, p<>l!.tlcal, and
development

f~r

the r<>re8eeable future .

W~t

18 to be

ant'clpated, I believe is m..,re rapid progress tn building
econ")my, with continued e'1l:ohasis on pr')ducti.on.

are

80

diverse, tta

popu'~t1.on

so

V8St,

Ch ~ ns.'s

Ch 4 na's resources

and tts needs

80

great

that the emphas1s could c?nt l nue to be placed on internal development tor many years to come.

I
c mtacts

w)~ld

bet\~een

Un ted States.

anticipate th3t there will be an expansion of
China and the reat

the w.:>rld, tncluding t.he

So far as I can see, the steps taken thua far by

the President and the

Ch~ese

Premier to normalize relatlons are

trreveralble provtded, I repeat,
Ollt

'..if

er,?vlde~

:)f Viet N.,m is also lrrevers' ble .

that this nat t')n , s course

\\1 thout peace 1n

Indochina,

there ;s little likelihood of a stgnitlcant expansion of peaceful

contact with China .
As tor ruture relations between the Ch nsse and
selves, I be leve that we can

~l.B~lve

o~r-

the fears of the past by

an honest exchange of vlewpotnts, mutual c 'ns"derat 1 ,n, and decent
restratnts 1n dealIng with one another.

The differences which

exist and \'J11l continue t.; exist need n,jt lead to coni'llct.
the contrary, they can be adjusted to mutual gain.
We are a young nRtional culture relatIve to Ch t na,
hundreds of years compared with thousands of years.

There is

much to be learned and gained on both aide_, in agriculture,

On

•

industry,

p~llution contr~l,

health, education and many ?ther

r'elds .
~~ere

are human vAlues

be examined and weighed.

t~

mutual educative pr,cess has begun anew .
talned on the basts of

of

eqtk~11ty

The

The pr?cess must be main-

tre~tment

and respect.

The

days of' the one-sided relat'.onshlp whIch ,:,nce extsted with China--

of teacher-puptl, mJ3ster-seorvant, benefactor and dependent, and
S~

on back int:" the 19th Century' 5 "en11ghtened and heathen," a r e

g~ne

and it lG hard to see who

1~

c?ntemporary Ch'na or in this

natl-:>n wlll m:>urn their passIng .
h~d

Chou En-lai noted that 1t

the Opium Wars for the Chtnese peopl e

are standlng up.

Self-reliancE"

1.9

t~

taken

",O~

st,nd up . "

Today, they

their 'Watchw""Ird and .: m that

b'lsls they are building a new Ch',nA.

In the years ahead, you

will aJso be building, as each generati.,n does,

In the Unlted States .

years since

8

new nation here

I would hrype tMt tt wUl rp.main r ooted i n

."

.

•

the

8~il

o~

the

present and to

p~s~

even 18

pr'v~de

centage of

t'J

is

~edes

gnad

·~r

'v~ng'n

t he

n?pe Rnd c?n.ft.dence f')r the future .

I regret t? sr}y"
y'JU w.lth reg3rd

~t

t~1'lt

the legacy wh'ch hAs been le"'t t o

'1Ur relat!?ne l'I!th Chln'1 con":ains 3 h gh per-

dlst~rt:on

t'?ns w th other parts

wh tefl, 1n turn, h'18 hlJlped t'J dl stlJrt rela ~r

the globe .

example, that we h3ve spent and

~re

It Is n?
c)n~lnuing

~ccldentJ

f)r

tl spend the lIves

of tens of th)US3nds of Americans In Indochina nnd tens 0: blllions
or

:n that tragic c)nf11ct .

d~llars

or the price ?r tW? decades
s?oner we

f~ce

,~

These sacrtf 1 ces 3re a

d storti)n I n

up to th's underlying

C~UBe

?~

~art

p?l t cy and the

Ch1n~

the Ind?ch1na war

the better.
You, wh:> are n?t saddled w'th the myths <jf the

p~st,

cl'tn p1'1Y a 'llrge r:->le 'n c'.earing away th s debr's.

On the hee'.s

of the Preal,dent's Inltillt've, the reality ")f Chona

8 beg'nnl.ng

t, trtckle tnto the c")oectousness of government .

The enlightenment

.• .
of your generation can speed that
you wIll

n~t

pr~cess .

be fettered with the fears

will look at the world

aro~d

May

To
yo~

sh3pe a better relationship between this
all nations .

the past, that you

you with fresh clarity and f:nd the

c)urage to thInk y?UX own thoughts.

is the well-spring of freedom.

~f

I am c?nfident that

thln~

YJur ?wn th?ughto

draw deeply on it to help
natl~n

and Chtna and with
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TOWARDS A POREIGN POLICY OF MUTUALITY

Commencement Address by Senato r Mike Mansf i e l d (D., Montana)
Monta na State University, Boz eman, Montana
Saturday, June 10, 1972, 10:00 a .m . , M. D. T.

I come here today t o convey a wo rd of optimism rega rd i ng
the nat ion's f oreign re l at ions .

Optimism i n this co nne ction 1s

long overdue; still, I hope my reference t o i t at this time is
no t premature.

Whateve r the ca se, my expectation 1s that history

may we ll rec o rd 1972 as the year i n wh ich a corner was turned
for peace .
towards

There are i ndications that the wo r ld is headed back

c~ nstruct l ve

re lationships.

human purpos e in its ma jor i nternat i onal

A water-shed appears t o have been reached a fter a

quarter century of dangerous dallying in the murky det our s o f the
Cold War.
Ins ofar as the government of th t s nat ion is conc erned,
except i n the case o f Indochina, I believe the President is
responding in a new fashion t o inte r national circumstances.
is pr ojecting not

8S

adve r sary but as conciliator .

He

In s o dO i ng,

J

•
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he is paying heed to the legitimate claims of a public

sentiment gr?wn impatient with the words of peace, sung to
the cadence of war.
So, I address a word of hope especially to you men and
women of th is graduating class.

Your generation can take a great

deal of credit for bringing about this change.

Your manifest

disenchantment with the foreign policies of the past and with
the traglc travesty in the name of peace in Indochina has been
impressed on Washington.

You have underscored the point that

government is itself gove rned, in the final analYSiS , by the
depth and degree of public support which can be commanded for

its policies.
You have helped to inject balance into offic ial c hannels
and, hopefully, to assure that government will not soon again
~

indulge i n meaningless adventures abroad, large ly at the expense
of young life .

If we are, in fact, going through the last Viet Nam,

if we are, in fact, getting out at last, as I devoutly hope, you
have done your share to that end .

-

.,- -

To be sure, the millenium has not yet arrived.

Doomsday

missiles in the United States point at doomsday missiles several
thousand miles and a few minutes a way.
on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

We stjll have vast garrisons

Planes are still engaged in

ra Lni ng terror out of the Indochina skies.

Shtps sow the

inst ruments of destruction in the waters south of China.

Indeed,

the Secretary of Defense has just told us that the spread of
conflict, by sea and air, once again into North Viet Nam--this
latest episode in the continuing agony of the Indochina War,
will cost the people of the nation an addit i onal $5 billion
this year, not to speak of more lives, more prisoners-or-war,
and more missing in Betton.
Nor should we overlook, in any note of optimism, the
social and economic overload wh ich arises at home from these and
other wast ing demands abroad; the capacities of the nation are
great but they are not unlimited.

The strain of serving, for a

quarter-of-a-century as the world's leading policeman, banker,
pioneer in space and what-not shows jn the prices that are paid

- 4 in every store 1n the nation.

It shows, too, i n the neglect

of the env i ronment, 1n the decay of citIes and in the rise of
crime, drug addiction and other barometers of social breakdown

within our society.
Before we can speak o f any real light at the end of the
tunnel, we must face up to the i mmedlate problems of the trans i tion
from the exertions o f war to the wo rk of peace.

That the

adjustments can be d iff ic ult a nd painful has been brought home t o

us by the President's announcement that the ABM site a t Ma l mstr om
will become Inoperative under the terms of the Ni xon- Brezhnev
treaty .

In this case, as in many others, we must find -- the

federal government has an obligation to ass is t i n finding-constructive alternatives .
These qua l if ications aside, however, the fact i s that the
world has come a long distance towards sanity a nd o rder in the
short space of a few months.

That is why, in my judgment , the

class of 1972 can look wi th some confidence t o the future.

- 5 There is a chance that the evil genies which have plagued us for
a quarter century can be put back securely in the bottle.
Consider what has been achieved by the diplomacy of the
past year.

What comes to mind most vividly, of course, is the

President's just completed journey to Moscow .

The accords

which were concluded there were highly significant in themselves.
Yet, the most important result of the Moscow summit may be found
not in specific achievements. Rather, it may emerge from the
changes of natlonal attitude on both sides which were reflected
in the meetings .
The results of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks indicated a clear
acceptance of mutual self-interest as the basis for the future
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States .
We have not always been very prompt in the past to recognize
national self-interest as a basis for a policy of peace .

To be

,-

sure, we have sometimes over-assumed a national interest, as in
Viet Nam and on that basis, spent the lives of tens of thousands

- 6 o f Amer i cans and permitted ove r $130 bi lli on do llars t o be suc ked
up by the destructive sponge o f that confl i ct.

NOW, after years

o f this deadly wa stage we have at last d i sc overed that our on l y
va l i d

nat \~ n al

c~ncern

i s t o g et ba ck t he pr i s oners o f war a nd

the recoverable missing 1n a c t ion.

We have come at l ast

t~

rea li ze that our only national i nterest i s t o get out o f the

-

Ind ochina i nvolv ement, l OCK, s t OCK and barrel.

If on S0me occas ions we have over- assumed nat ional i ntere sts ,
on others, we ha ve i gnored them al most a s tho ug h they were not
fi tt i ng t o a great power.

So , we ha ve he si t a ted t o def i ne our

bona f i de conc erns a nd purs ued, i ns t e a d, th e wi ll o 'the wi sp o f

i de ological c onfl i ct .

We have d one so on the basts o f s uch

s l ogans as II Make the Wo rld Sa fe f or Democ racy,

II

and most recent l y

the rl Batt l e f or the Minds o f Men U or the "Cont a i nment o f Communi s m.

II

The pursuit of i de ologi ca l s truggle has not led us t o any v i ctor i e s .
Rathe r , it has pr ojected us into a hodge-podge of f o r eign aid ,
military allianc es and into ove r seas pro pagand a and othe r dub ious

llI:tnlpulntive

oper:.ltlon~J.

'(

-

'['he wnrm hum.qn concern

or

Amer\clln!;

for o ther pcople.s has been dlst.orted by Ideolog.lcal warfnre nnd

we have plunged, w tll 'l ut warrant,

tnt:)

t.h~

int.ernal pnl1 tIcal

and socIal af'fll i rs of other nattnn!:) eV('T,ywhere In tile world.

For two decades thIs costly exercIse has become n way of 1 Ire [or
hundreds of

thous~nds

of AmerlcRns, some

() f

whom have scarcely

set foot I.n the Un l.ted Stotes f n r many years.
light of hope,

I r there Is n new

It ts In large part becausE' t.hls rnnd om ('lolling

appears t o be coming to

An

end .

In plnce

(I f

the cacophony of the

Cold WflT, the recent Moscow conferenc;e 5pnke soft -'y of "BasIc
Pr i ncIples o f Mutua] Relations between thf' Unlted StR.tes and the

U.S.S . R.

IT

In these prtnclpleG , the

tW )

nAtions rec og nIzed that

there Is no feasIble ans wer In a nuclenr age to the prospect of
mutua 1 ann I hll n t I on other than mutual coIl abo rat I on .
The two pl)wers have begun, now, to move toward what President
Nlxon has called n position of Ilmutually agreed restralnt ll In
armaments.

']'0 that end, a treaty hAS bef'n ne gotll'lted by President

- 3 Nixon

t~

limit o ffens i ve and defens ive strategic nuclear weapons

on both sides .

As I have already indicated, this treaty has a

s pec ial mean ing for Monta na because it is expected that Malmstrom
will not be devel o ped now as Rn ABM site .

In the ci rcumstances,

what I t ol d the Senate .in opposing the ABM program three years
ago bears repeat i ng today.

On April 1 , 1969, I sajd:

II Ie this

propos ed ABM missile system ... is r ig ht for the nat ion, it will
be r ight fo r Montana.

If it is wrong fo r the nat ion, however, the

location of one s i te at Ma lmst r om canno t make i t r lght .
II Wha t economic benef it t o a Mon tana communI ty wi ll equa 1
the a dd itional tax burdens and the new i nflati on wh ic h will
weigh on all the people of Montana ... ?

If the system bec omes an

i nsatiable maw f or the consumption of public res ources, who will
pay for the negl ect of o ther urgent needs, if not all the people
of the nat ion including Montanans,? 11
That was my position on the ABM three years ago.
my posit io n.
Nixon-Brezhnev
tr>'-

h

It remains

I will support the President i n regard to the

Treaty~

1X..l. JlN"'..4 ;G ~'-<-L ~
t:lU
~

.P

t;L:..u..:J-

.M

tV

.~f.-

'e>-r£ ~~fv

- 9 The diplomacy by wh ich the treaty was negotiated 1s similar
to that which led the President to take the first steps 1n
breaking down the barriers of tsolation and separation with the
People!s Republic of China .

To digress for a moment for a personal

note, let me say that on March 29 , 1968, I gave the first lecture
sponsored by the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation at the
University.

The subject was "China :

Retrospect and Prospect . 11

My remarks, four years ago, contained this statement :
lilt ought to be made unequivocal that we are
prepared at all times to meet with Chinese
representatlves -- formally or informally-- in
order to consider differences between China
and the United States ove r Viet Nam or a ny other
question of common concern . I!
The President's visit to Pek i ng early this year which
was followed by the journey of the Senate Minority Leader and
myself a fe w we eks ago, has now made unequivocal the readiness

-

l~

-

of this nat "on to meet with China to the end that difficulties
may be dissolved and civil contact restored between the two
peoples.

Four years is a long time.

it is a beginning.

It is a long delay-- but

The Great Wall of separation has cJmmenced

to crumble and the way to a stable peace in Asia is opening at last.

What the President has done wit h regard to the Chinese
Pe ~ ple's

Republic is to remove a self-imposed straight-jacket

on the foreign policies of the nation.

Following World War II,

for example, rather than face the great upheaval which had taken
place in China, we chose not to recogn i ze but to quarantine it .

We cut ourselves off from contact with these monumental changes,
thinking all the while that by so doing we somehow could exercise
political control over them.

In retrospect, it is clear that we

had little or no effect over the course of events.
The fact is that there was a viable and independent
government in cont r ol in China for many years before we chose
to acknowledge that such was the case .

It avalled us nothing

-
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to igno re and isolate ourselves from that government.

Yet, we

continued to do so long after this policy had lost the last
shred of a rationale .
Now that myths have begun to be replaced by rea lities ,
we can proceed to explore wit h the People's Republic of China,
as the President has started to do with the Soviet Union , the
possibilities of mutual accommodation .

The change comes very late .

Already, as I have indicated, the economy of the nat i on reveals
the stresses imposed by unrealistic and excessively costly
foreign - defense policies.

Last year, for example, it was necessary

to devalue the dollar, to ra is e import duttes and to impose
domestic controls to prevent a catastrophic breakdown 1n the
nat i.on 1s financial grid .

The process of adjustment had been

delayed too long to make a graceful and painless transition and
it wi ll be prudent to anticipate still other shocks in the future .
Nevertheless, we are now moving in the direction of
mutuality, of a sharing of responsibilities and leadership with

- 12 -

other nations.

In part, this process depends on negotiations.

In part, however, it is possible to take unilateral actions.
It is not always necessary to await the pleasure of others in
order to lighten our self- imposed burdens.

I have, for example,

not hesitated to urge unilateral action at various times wi th

regard to Viet Nam in an effort to bring the involvement to a
more rapid concluston .

....-t-w.-F

mistake~,adventure

I have done s o because the ending of this

is our problem and our problem alone.

Every

day that the involvement perSists adds to the burdens of the

people of this nation, to the list of dead and wounded and to the
devastation of the hapless people of Indochina.
an interest in our withdrawal from this conflict.

Others may have
But none has

a more vital interest than this nation in getting out without delay.
I have also urged unilateral action to bring about a
substantial reduction of U. S. forces in Europe.

There is no

rhyme or reason, in my judgment, to keep more than half- million
U. S, military personnel and dependents in western Europe a quarter

- 13 of a century after World War II at the expense of the people
of the United States.

Whatever purposes of foreign policy the

U. S. garrison in Europe may still serve, the same purposes can
be met by a far smaller contingent.

As it is now, thls enormous

dep loyment is a dra i n on U. S. revenues; it is fuel for inflation
in the Unlted States and it is a major source of the weakness of
the dollar in re lation to the currencies of other nations.
I have stressed this issue time and again against the
resistance of the Executive Branch under the Administrations of
three Presidents .

Insofar as I am

c~nce rned,

it will continue

to be stressed, notwithstanding the Moscow agreements which call
for negotiation of mutual and balanced reduct ions of forces in
Europe .

The fact is that the Soviet Union does not pay for this

antiquated and largely i rrelevant U. S. depl oyment .
do not pay for it .
their taxes.

The Europeans

The people of this nation pay the cost in

I see no particular virtue in prolonged negotiations

with the Russians to bring about a reduction of U. S . forces which

- 14 should have been done years ago in our own interest.

I am

appalled to think of the billions which have already been

wasted in this long waiting game.
There was a time within the clear remembrance of many of
us here today, when the rhetoric of Cold War was part and parcel
of policy.

That was a time when there did not appear to be any

mutuality of interests between East and West and when it would

have been futile to urge unilateral steps to reduce tensions.
Those were the days when each nation was what George Washington
so correctly described as the

II

s 1ave of its own animosity.!!

The essential fact in precipitating the Cold War was that
two powerful new forces - -ideology and technology--came together at
the close of World War II.

Th j s fusion vastly complicated the

whole interplay of international affairs.
problem was awesome in its simplictty.

The technological

With the great flood of

scientific and engineering advances, governments came into
possession of the power of instant an d world wide destruction.
In consequence , the proce sses of statec r aft were compres s ed in
time and al t ered r adically in conduct .

- 15 In this country there was a Constitutional fall - out from
these technological developments.

The power of the Executive

Branch in foreign affairs increased drastically even as the

~ ~~

iJ-. ~ ...- R~ rJ~.J.-z-/

power of legislatures shrank in proportion .

In crises, so it

was reasoned, there would not be time to make political decisions,
much less debate the issues .

At the same time, the new technology

of war, by its scope and complexity, became more than ever a
partner of government, with a vested interest in its own perpetuity
and a high potential for distorting public decisions about war
and peace .
The other aspect of the Cold War--the ideological problem-arose from the fact that t wo of the victors in World War II- - the
Soviet Union and the People!s Republic of China--were revolutionary
states committed to a system of social and ec onomic organization
which was anathema to this nation .

The conspiratorial aspect of

Communism posed a particularly painful problem for the United
states, breeding suspicion , distrust and division in government .

- 16 It became difficult to separate valid threats to national
security from the bombast of the power-seekers.

Enlightened

public debate became constrained and as a result public policy
was not always subjected as fully as it should have been to the
purgative of critical challenge.

So the political paroxysms

of the 150's led to the rigid policies of the '60's.
History may well record that we pursued the correct foreign
policies into the early 1960's; that we bought time, through
containment and counterforce, to permit the gradual moderation
of Communist power, thereby reducing the Marxist states to the
political dimensions of other nations.

However that may be, it

has been apparent for some time that we persisted in these policies
too long.

We were blind to changes elsewhere and to the possibili-

ties of adjusting to mutual interest.
the disaster of Viet Nam.

In the end, we came to

It is part of the price which has been

exacted for the obstinate pursuit of the obsolete in foreign
policy.

- 17 How can it be prevented from happening again?

Quite

possibly the world will not soon see a repetition of the
particular confluence of historical forces--ideology and
technology--which produced the r igidities of the Cold War.

Possibly, the awareness of our own electorate may now be such
that prolonged periods of national self-delusion will no longer
be countenanced.

Perhaps, more effective techniques wi ll be

found in the art of government wh ich will act to limber the dead
weight of mass ive bureaucracy and so bring about a greater
responsiveness to changing circumstances both at home and
abroad,

Perhaps, the addition of the under-21-voters to the

_~~~~DI~electorate ~w ill

revitalize the entire political process.

In

any event, it is doubtful that your generation--seared as it
has been by the folly and outrage of Viet Nam- - will long
suffer in silence a foreign policy wh ich is based on the
outdated.

- 18 In the final analysis it comes down to the degree
to which an enlightened and vigorous electorate will probe

and test and call to account the policies of its own government.
President Brewster of Ya l e has put it in these words:
IIExposure, questioning, reappraisal are often

painful, even agonizing; their price 1s noth i ng,

however, compared to the resentment aroused by a
feeling of manipulated i gnorance.

II

Your generation has some reason to feel, I'm sure, that
it has paid the h ig h price of "manipulated ignora nce.

II

At lea st

you have the advantage of knowing clearly what your generation
must avoid.

I am confident that you can and will not only skirt

the pitfalls of the past, but being thus spared the old burdens,
you wi ll be free to explore the vast possibilities of mutual
accommodat i on with all peoples in a world which i s now beginning
to be liberated from its obsolete fears .
You can do no more.

You should do no less.
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Before the Joint Economic Committee
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13, 1972

Mr . Chairman :

I appreciate being invited to participate in these hearings on the
Chinese economy .
subject .

Your Committee is to be commended for its work on this ttmely

These hearings can make a significant contribution to public knowledge

about developments in China's economy and social system .
I do not profess to be either an economist or an expert on China .
What I vill say is based on recent personal observations over a period of
16 days in six different Chinese cities and the surrounding countryside,
many conversations, and an interest in Asian affairs dating from my service
as a

PFe in the Marines in China in the 1920 s .
I

As a preface to my observations , I want to urge that the Committee
take with a grain of salt aoy so- called estimates it may receive about Chioa's
gross oational product .

On the basis of my observations I ....ould say that our

concept of GNP has little,

if

any, practical application to China .

Any general
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use of GNP as a gauge of the state of China ' s eeoc.amy could add to the already

seriously distorted view we have of that country .
There 1s no effective way to measure the GNP and little meaning in
the measurement in a country with a socialized economy that is based largely

on human labor .

While production 1s stressed in China, the society does not

encourage consumption of goods and services as a stimulant to production .
There 1s, for example, no advertising of products of any kind in China.

How can one equate, in Western value terms , moreover,

~ the

building of

dikes, aqueducts, bridges, factories, housing, recreational facil i ties and

on across the spectrum of economic

development-~all

created primarily by

human labor , much of it mobilized on a volunteer basis?

Where does the

volunteer labor of tens of millions in massive public health programs show
in the GNP?
No visitor of 16 days can expect to fathom the mysteries of that
vast and complicated land .

Any outsider who looks at China sees a distorted

picture which, at best, can be tempered by perspective .

An observer, for

example , can see the bottle, which is China, as half full or as half empty .
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If China ' 5 progress and its system are judged against living standards in

this nation--by the number of cars, television sets , telephones, or plumbing
fixtures --the bottle will be half empty, if that .

But the new China is best

measured as the Chinese themselves measure it, On the basis of China ' s past
A!t.~

or against the conditions prevailing in other 11!¥Je.

nations of Asia .

I have seeD. the old China, and. I have traveled widely througnout Asia .

In my

view, China's bottle 1s filling rapidly .
I would sum up the status of China ' s social and economic system 1n
three words :

It 1s working .

The contrast with the China of the past that I

remembered is nothing short of remarkable .

Today the people are well fed,

~~~

well clothed, and, from all outward

signs, ~.

The farms, or COtmllUDeS,

appear to be prolific and well managed ; much new land is being brougnt into
cultivation and the ravages of nature controlled; the streets and. sidewalks
of the cities are clean; the parks meticulously tended; the shops well stocked
with food , clothing and other consumer items ; policemen are evident only for
contrOlling traffic ; military or other armed personnel are conspicuous by
their absence ; the housing ranges from adequate to marginal all at low rents ;

- 4-

conspicuously absent are the hundreds of thousands of homeless who were to be
seen a few decades ago in the streets and waterways of China's cities and can

still be seen elsewhere in Asia; there is no visible evidence of begging, drug
addiction, alcoholism, or delinquency .
The people appear to be well motivated and give the tmpression of
applying themselves vigor ously in whatever tasks they are pursuing .
and men work side by side in the field and the factories .

Women

The disparity between

the factory worker and the peasant is closing and tbe standard of living of
both 1s rising .

China ' s crops have been good for the last sever al years, due

not only to favorable weather but to intensive effort, the increased use of
fertilizer and scientific methods, more irrigation, and the bringing of new
land into production .

China is now a net exporter of foodstuffs.

The wage of the aver age factory worker 1n Pek1ng 1s the equivalent of
about $22 a month , that of his wife will be about the same or higher ; their
ch1ldren are cared for w1thout charge at a nursery or in public schools ; rent
takes about

~

or less of i ncome ; bas1c food prices are low; for all pr actical

purposes, med1cal care and r ecreational facilities are free , and the family

- 5 -

probably ta. 5 a savings account in the factor y bank .

.c

Cooking 011s 1 rice , wheat ,

and cotton cloth ( but not synthetics) are still rationed but the allotments are
5 aid to be ample and the system designed more to assure fair distribution thao.

to cope with shortages .
items , except wheat .

In fact , China exports large quantities of all of these

~eryone

rides a bicycle or a bus :)....

----

Industrial progress has carried the Chinese economy a great distance
from that of a quarter - of- a - century ago when even bicycles and radios had to be
imported .

In Shanglla.i we saw impressive examples of modern heavy industry .

Before 1949 Shanghai !s smelters produced only tvo types of ordinary carbon
steelj now they turn out more than 1,000 types of steel .

The range of

production is from everyday household articles to nuclear devices and space
rockets .
Factories and communes are generally more than production centers j
they are also self- contained social units .

At a cotton textile mill which we

visited in Sian, in Northwest China, for the 6,380 workers , there were dormitories
for the unmarried , apartments for families, dining halls, barber shops , libraries ,
clubs , outdoor sports facilities, swimming pools, primary and middle schools ,
and medical clinics .

- b -

The orsanization or the 80% of China ' s population which lives outside
the cities is illustr ated by the Ma Lu commune ) to the South of Shanghai .
commune , as is the case with others , is more than a farm .

This

It is a key unit

Ma Lu is a self- contained community over

in China ' s new social orsanizatioo .

6 )500 families ( more than 25 )000 people)) all having a direct or indirect interest
in the commune ' s output since both their personal iocome and China ' s overall
progress depelld

00

their efforts .

Last year ) income was about $336 per household .

At the Commune there were 33 primary aod secoodary schools , a hospital, a clioic
for each of the 14 production brigades, and a health worker for every team .
Extensive power equipment and machioe cultivation is in use on

Ma Lu Commune .

Much of what is produced is processed

00

site and there is

also manufacturiog both for io- house need and for external distribution .
Among the maoufactures are

~soline

engines for farm machinery, farm tools )

spare parts for tractors , insecticides, aod some consumer products .

These

"farm factories" account for 5C!f:, of' the value of the commune ' s total output .
The restoration of nature ' s past ravages , and the cooservatioo of
natural resources , have been given great emphasis by the Chinese government .
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As cODtrasted with the former parched look of that landscape, the sight of
miles upon miles of

tr~~y
~si:'''~he
I'

altered the local weather for the better .

plantings are said to have

Throughout China arable land is

being created out of wasteland and massive water-control projects are being
built to control destructive floods and droughts.

Human waste is recycled,

a system which helps to explain why the Chinese, with a population four times
ours, have unpolluted rivers and streams and an enormous output of fresh water
fish .

This system of recycling also returns to the s011, as organit fertilizer,

most of what has been taken from it 1n the growing cycle, thus serving to

maintain a natural fertility .
A word should also be said about Chinese medical care.

Only a few

years ago little, if any, health care was available to the vast majority of the
people .

Now medical care is free for all workers in the cities.

On the communes

each family pays about 4 cents per month for treatment by medical personnel
attached to the commune .

The ancient practice of acupuncture has been updated

and is now used widely as both a treatment for various types of ailments and as

.,;.a highly effective anesthetic for operations .

The public has been effectively
1\

motivated to help stamp out public health problems, to eradicate snails , flies,
mosquitoes and other disease carriers.

- 8 As for trade, the Chinese regard their needs, from abroad, as limited.
The emphasis 1s on the use of inner resources for economic building blocks in
order to develop an independent capacity to meet the people1s needs.

Locomotives,

tractors, cars, sewing machines, clothes--on across the industrial spectrum-a whole range of products are now made exclusively on that basis .

Most of this

capaCity bas been developed, largely in isolation, during the past decade and a

half.
China's foreign trade is governed by two principles:

( 1) equality

and mutual benefit, and (2) the exchange of what exists in surplus for what is
lacking.

With trade, the few gapD left by domeotic supplies of raw materials are

filled and the sophisticated machinery and capital goods that are not yet built
Within China are obtained •
•

In addition to this frugal standard for external needs, China has a
conservative poliCY of trade finance .

Foreign trade is kept in rough balance and

there is no external debt (internal either, for that matter).

Much of China's

best quality consumer goods--bicycles, radios, textiles and so on--are produced
for export .

Rice is sold abroad to help pay for imports, including wheat.

China's foreign trade is quite small relative to population .
it is estimated that exports were $2 . 3 billion and imports $2.2 billion.

In 1911

- 9 However 1 the growth of the twice - e.- year Canton Trade Fair since its beginning 1n
1957 illustrates the increase in China ' s interest in the world market .

The goods

for sale at the first Fair were exhibited in a building of 12, 000 square feet
with 1, 200 people 1n attendance .

The Fair now occupies three buildings

totaling

50,000 square feet and more than 30, 000 different items for sale are displayed or
represented .

Twenty thousand people attended last fall ' s Fair and. for the first

ten days of the last Fair, which ended on May 15 , attendance was 10,000 .
There was vast variety at the Fair 1 especially of conswner goods such as

clothing, foodstuffs, textiles , clocks, radios, musical instruments , and , of
course, the traditional Chinese arts and crafts .

competitive on the world market .

Goods are priced to be

A well- DBde bicycle which would cost the

equivalent of $70 retail inside China sold for about $28 wholesale for export .
There were alsO several types of trucks, tractors and many items of farm equipment
and machinery for sale, illustrating how China sometimes puts foreign trade
above internal requirements .

All in ali, the Fair was a remarkable display of

China ' s great and diversified productive capacity.
The United States purchased only a few million dollars worth of Chinese
goods last year , mostly through Hong Kong .

But Chinese goods appear to be an

"in" thing today, and. substantial increases in imports of Chinese consumer
goods are likely this year .

/0
li8' -

Solid trade relations, however, cannot be based on fads--the
sale of chop-sticks , Mao buttons or rice wine .

It is not clear at this point

what we have that the Chinese want that they cannot obtain cheaper els ewhere,
or what Americans will want and need from China over an extended period.

Never-

theless, it seems to me that the Administration would be well-advised to pursue
trade prospects vigorously , not only because there may be profits to be made
~,

~

but also because good mutual trade relations can be an important factor in

breeching in peace the great wall of separation whi ch has stood between the

nations for almost a quarter of a century .

tolO

Good trade relat i ons tend to equal

good foreign relations .
From my observations , it seems to me that China ' s society is strong,
dynamic and unified perhaps as never bef'ore in modern history .

"Serve the People "

is Chairman Mao ' s mandate and there seems to be a great dedication among the
Chinese in pursuing it.

The Chi nese are extending the traditional concept of

reliance on the family unit as basic to the social structure , to the commune or
factory and to the nation as a whole .
on a "one f'or all and all for one

Chi na is becoming a national family , based

concept of social and economic development .

What the people of China have achieved in the last two decades is , I believe,
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truly remarkable .

Like 1t or not , the system of the People ' s Republic seems

to be working very well for them and they for it .
We are a young nation relative to China, 200 years compared with
thousands of years .

There is much we can learn from this ancient and rich culture

and there is much ChIna can learn from us .
begun again .
()A ...... //...

A

The mutual educational process has

This time i t is not one-sided--tea cher-pup il or

missionary -~

R1dnRIl.

t~ ·

This time it is on a basis of equality and it had best be kept that way for there
is no other way which is like y to be acceptable to the Ch:nese or to our own
people .

As Premier Chou En-1a1 said , when our conversations were coming to a

close , it took "100 years since the Opiwn Wars for the Chinese people to stand

up .

Indeed , they are standing up and they have every right to look with

satisfaction on wha t they have created with their own energy and resources in
scarcely two decades .

When one who remembers the old China , the change which

has been wrought is nothing less than extraordinary .

-
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., .MONTANA)
NOMINATING ROBERT SARGENT SHRIVER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY
DELIVERED BEFORE THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1972
I would like nothing better than to be able to say to
this Committee that it 1s three months to the election of a
Democratic President.
Why Democrats?

other direction?

Reason compels me, instead, to ask:

Why this party?

I

Why not a full turn 1n the

Why not Republican control 1n both Houses

of Congress?

So I will not say what , I would +lke to say.

I will ask,

'.
instead , the questions whi ch we must ask ourselves as we gather
here to set a new beginning.

We are wi lling but are we also

ready to provide a leadership which will reverse a declining ,
public faith i n all political leadership?

Are we ready to goverp a nation growing tired of cold,
distant, stage-managed, government?

I

As Democrats, what are we prepared to say to the youth
of the nation who lee themaelvel, .till, Atter thr •• y.&r. ot

/

---.-----~-

I
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this administration, as the captives of the mistakes of another
generation?

What significance does this party have for the

young people who will vote for the first t i me?

What do we mean,

not only to the young on campus but to the young in the armed

services, the factories, the offices, on the farms, 1n the
warehouses of the nation--yes, and in the drug clinics and on
the streets of the nation's cities?

What of the aged poor and the poor of all ages?

What can

we say to them of ever higher prices and threadbare incomes?
a party and as

~

As

people, are we alive, not only to the economics,

but to the price in human dignity of inadequate food, clothing,
shelter, and health care?
What of those _of moderate income?

Are we ready to confront

the bone-deep concern of the tens of millions of Americans who
(

live precariously on the edge of the unbalanced wheels of the
economy?

What of the burden of taxation which these millions of

wage-earners bear so directly?

I

- 3 What do we say to the small business man and the independent
farmer--the Americans who do not reap the profits of a vast waste
1n the name of national defense?

What of the cities and their failing public serv!ces--

pollce, fire, health, education, sanitation, or whatever?

What

of the tattered environment and its future habitability?

Can we do better?

Or are we able to say, only, that what

1s now being done 1s being done badly?
These are the questions which the people of the nation
are ask1ng .

These are the questions to which they have a right

to answers 1n the weeks ahead.

These are questions which go to

the heart of democratiC government 1n our times .
The fact is that the nation faces the problems of dinosaur
government, of a government fed fat with public funds but grown
insensitive to the needs of the American people and, perhaps,
even to the needs of its own survival.

They are problems which

cry out for a national lea"dershlp which will face up to the
mistakes of the past and move the nation with confidence into the
future.

·I

- 4 That 1s the meaning of the coming election.
election unlike any in living memory.
November 1s for change.

It 1s an

To be sure, the call of

But it 1s not a change to be brought

about by the thumping of old political pots and pans.
listen to the many voices of the land.

many faces of the nation.
hearts of the people.

We must

We must look into the

We must attune our hearts with the

In so doing, there can come to this party

a new unlty--north, east, south, and west--a unity born of common
dedication to the equal treatment of all Americans.
We are, 1n all bluntness, off to a bad start.
face it.

Let us

Let us acknowledge it honestly and let us go on from

there.
To that end, we are here to complete the leadership of
the party.

I urge thi s Committee to designate as the candidate

of the Democratic Party for the Vice Presidency, one who 1s no
stranger to public trust, responsibility, and dedication.
record needs no recitat ion.

You know it.

His

The press knows it.

- I.

.
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Soon, the nation will know it.
service.

It 1s a record of outstanding

It 1s a record of a great ability in activating

government to serve the public interest, of skill and understanding
in the conduct of i nternat i onal affa i rs and of a deep personal
concern for the needs of human be i ngs.
The nation 1s ready for an end to divided government.

The

nation 1s ready for an a dministrati on that not only speaks of
peace but acts for peace, f or peace now.

The nation 1s ready

for an adm i nistrat i on whi ch will come home to put the national
houae in order and, i n so dolng , restore the capacity of this

nation to contribute effectively once again to the peace and
progress of the world.
Let us get on wi th it, then.

Let us name the Vice Presiden-

tial candi date of the Democrat i c Party_

Let us put beside George

McGovern w1thout delay the man whose name I now place in nomination as a Democrat1c cand i date for the Vice Presidency of the
United states:

Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr.

iV!.'1'·· ;"
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He are in the open - season in politics .
allegation fly thick and fast .

directions .

The arrows of

Political pot-shots come from all

North, south, east and west, the land is strewn with

tattered public reputations.
I have no inclination to join in the personal carnage .
it is over our national ills will sti ..... be with us .

\

not be made any easier by the wou.nds of politics .

When

Their cure will
In any event , this

is a bipartisan audience -- at least, I nope there -are a fe'''' Democrats
present .

It \,Iould be appropriate in the circumstances , I think, to

eschew the political in my remarks .

Let me proceed

~n

the principle

that people who live in the glass houses of national poll
not t hrow stones , especially at a convention of glass make.

~s

.

should
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It is my intention, instead, to talk to you about a nation
where recycling is not an
time immemorial .

i~sue

because waste has been recycled since

It is a nation where neither bottles nor anything

else of value 1s thrown away.

It 1s a nation several thousand years

older than the United States and many times more densely populated,
yet whose rivers and streams run teeming with fish.
This year the international r oads have all led to that country
and to its capital of Peking.

There is an ancient Chinese proverb

which loosely translated says that lithe journey of a thousand miles
begins with the first step.

II

In a shift of history., the first major

step towards China was taken for this nation by President Nixon and
I applaud

\?im

for it .

When a similar shift is also noted in the

President's approach to Soviet Russia, we begin to have some measure
of the magnitude of the transition which 1s underway in the international scene.
The President's visit to Peking set off a chain reaction.
Subsequent missions were undertaken by the bipartisan leaderships of
the Senate and the House.

Additional visits of international

- - - - - -- - --

.

"

- 3 signifi cance have been undertaken by other countries, most recently,
that of Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan .

To grasp what is taking place today, these visits must be seen

-.

against the background of past policy toward China .

At mid - century,

the American political scene was dominated by one theme :

China?!!

"Hho lost

Stentorian voices asked the question from one end of this

nation to the other .

Scapegoats were dragged out of government

agencies and academic life to be paraded before Congressional commit tees and held up to public scorn .

We sought an explanation for the

failure of a policy in this/ faShion because none
ble at the time .

oth~r

seemed plausi -

Fresh from the great military triumphs of \vorld

\

Har II, we "fere not yet ready -- as a nation--:-to
, face the fact that

three-quarters of a billion people could not be won or lost in the
mid- twentieth century by anybody except themselves .

It was inc on-

ceivable to us that anything except betrayal could be at fault in
the 111055 of China .

,
!,

II
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So the idea that China ''las something which had been allowed

to sllp thr ough our fingers into the hands of Moscow became firmly
imbedded in the nation ' s Asian policies.

So, too, did we come to

accept the illusion that China \'1as recoverable by us , in due course,
by ostracizing or flailing the government in Peking as tlun- Chinese ll

and "unleashing II Gene r alissimo Chiang Kai - shek .

These concepts were

expressed in a policy of building a military wall around China and

preparing , on Taiwan, forces of the National Government to retake the
mainland.

In time, this obsessive policy led us to send tens of thousands
of Amer i cans and Chinese, not to speak of Koreans to their deaths
unnecessaril~

parallel .

in the rash extension of the Korean war beyond the 38th

It led us to form a chain of Asian treaties whose links

were Taiwan , Japan, South Korea and nations of Southeast Asia--all
weak and all dependent on the United States for survival .

U. S . bases

were establi s hed , willy nill y, in countries thr oughout the a r ea.
of thousands of U. S . forces were deployed to man the bases .

Tens

Tens

- 5 of billions of dollars were spent for military activities and foreign
aid .

Huge staffs of U. S . government administrators, military advisors,

construction workers and others "Jere sent to administer the aid .

The so-called IIcontainment policyll for the Far East which had
been precipitated by an expression of indignant public aversion to a
revolutionary China led us , step by step, into the terrible tragedy

of Indochina .

Nowhere along the line --and I include the Congress

with the various presidential administrations and the permanent bur eaucracy of the government- - did we find the wisdom and strength to
break the inertia .

He failed even to restrain this process until

more than half a million Americans "'ere bogged down in Indochina and

\

our country V,as confronted with the greatest internal divisiveness
since the Civil War .
He were drawn into a vortex by what \'ias seen as a !tlost!t China,
a reckless, beligerent conununist monster, set loose by MOSCON .

The

irony was that at the very same time, the leaders in Peking were re garding themselves as trying only to assert control over traditional

- 6 territories and attempting to build a ne'''' and unified nation

capable of meeting the needs of the Chinese people .

of

Il

Our policy

conta l ning China!! whether expressed in Korea, Taiwan or Viet

Nam, i n nuclear bases in Okinawa or 1n U- 2 flights over Chinese

terr i tory, was interpreted by Peking as a vicious extension of
tvestern imperialist effo r ts to dominate China .

a new generation as the number one- enemy .

We were held up to

For the first time in

decades, Chinese children were encouraged to hate the government

of t he once IIbeautiful countrylt as the name

II America ll

translates

into Chinese .
That is in the past.

The raw confrontation is now over .

Together with the Peking government, we have embarked on what is
likely to be a long slow journey of restoration.

President Nixon1s·

visit to Ch i na early this year was a symbolic act of the highest
significance in this process .

When the President and the Chinese

Premier touched glasses in toasts of mutual friendship, the death
knell of the containment policy in Asia tolled across the Pacific.
/

...
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As I have noted, the Joint Senate leadership follo\<led the

President to China last April and May .

Let me give you, now, a

few first-hand impressions of the changes which have taken place
in the lives of over 800, OOo}~oPle-- one fourth of the worldls
population .

I do so in order to provide some indication of the

kind of nation with which the world must reckon .

What the joint

leadership concluded differs little from what other Americans have
found in visits to the neVi China .

•

To digress for a moment, I might mention that I served as a

Marine in the old China .
~1arines.

Ever since I have been partial to the

\ When I '\'as in the Navy, I never rose above the rank of

•

Seaman 2nd Class .

During my Army hitch, I remained a buck private .

But the Marines, recognizing certain exceptional qualities in my
soldiering, elevated me for . the rest of my military career to the
rank of P. F . C.
I must add that my exposure to the old China ,,'as not limited
to a Kp l s view of the \'Jarlord era when Chinese scavenged the garbage

- 8 -

cans of the mess halls for food.

In 1944, I went again, as a young

Congressman on a mission for President Roosevelt, to a disease-

ridden, famine-stricken, wartorn free China, traveling the old
Burma Road and many parts of the West, specifically Yunnan and
Szechwan.

Again, shortly after the Japanese surrender, I visited

Peking and Tientsin once more and Tsingtao on the Northeast coast.
The contrast between the old China and China today, 1s
extraordinary.

To be sure, the Chinese People's Republic is more

closely controlled and highly organized than ever before.
lectual and artistic freedom are non-existent.

Intel-

Nor is there

representative government and free enterprise, as we know them.
However, if we have learned one truth from our experiences in Asia,
it should be that American values are not necessarily adaptable
wholesale in Asia.
What is of greatest relevance to the Chinese people at this
time is that the present system has led to the avallability of
adequate food, shelter, clothing and simple consumer goods.

It

- 9 has led to great

adv~nces

in public hea lth care, bastc education,

transportation, electrification, and the IJke .

It has developed

an economy which is capable of manufacturing, out of Chinese

res ources, thousands of products, from a pin

t~

nuc ear devices

and space satellites and the machine tools to produce them.
What is relevant, too, Is that the superstructure of control
is manned, not by a conspicuous and h:ghly privIleged elite as
in the past but by men and women who work amonF the people, who
dress like them and live with them.

Conformity there is, as there

has always been, for the great numbers of Chinese but
produced by a visible whip.

t : s not

Indeed, I do not th nk I saw more than

one or two f!re-arms anywhere In China during the ent re visit.
What is most striking 1s a universal sense of participation
in work.

A bona ride national family is emerging, with a "one for

all and all for one" concept of society.

The present system, in

short, seems to have succeeded i n undergird ing the personal pride
of the Chinese in China.

As Chou En-lai put it,

The Chinese people

·.
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can stand up again.

I'

As never before, China seems strong, dynamic,

unified and virtually classless.
As this vast uplift has gained in momentum, nat"ons have
beat a path to China's door.

For us, the time was over-ripe for

the President's initiative.

For several years, hostility between

the United States and China has been receding.

Long before the

President's visit, this country has ceased to be an unmitigated
ogre in China's eyes.

The focus of Peking's concern began to shift

elsewhere a decade ago, notably

t~

the Soviet

Uni~n

and to Japan.

Only the intrusion of the ill-fated Vietnamese involvement concealed
the extent of the shift.

As for the Soviet Union, at first, the Chinese leaders felt
to that country
bound closely/by what seemed to be a common ideology.

Moreover,

the relationship was cemented by the unifying force of a hostile
outside world.
diverged.

Over the years, however, ideological concepts

A serious cleavage developed between the two nations and

long-standing border questions and other irritants came jnto view.

,

.'
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The Soviet aid-program is a prime example.

At first

welc~med,

it

came to be seen in Ch na as something of a fraud which carried too
high a price tag for inferior goods and technologies.

While the

program has long since been discontinued and the Russians paid in
full and sent home, the sense of being cheated still rankles among

the Chinese .
Most serious , one million Soviet and Mongolian armed forces
on China's border are no longer regarded as communist allies .

On

the contrary, these fo rce s now loom as a menace of major proportions
on a par with, if not greater than U. S. military bases in Asia or
the prospect of a rearmed Japan.
As for China and Japan, the recent meeting of Premier Chou
and Prime Minister Tanaka sets the stage for further changes in the
special ties of the latter country with the United States .

Since

World War II, the Japanese have looked primarily to this nation not
only for security but also for the great portion of the foreign trade
wh ich supports their economic well-be ing .

On the other side of the

·

.'
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coin, Japan has followed very closely the U. S. lead in tnternational
relations.

Now, an immense economic dynamism has developed in Japan.

Japanese productive capacity ranks third in the world and Japanese
trade is flourishing on all continents.

This economic growth makes

possible greater independence in international policies; indeed, it
makes greater independence necessary.
The political settlement wh ich has been achieved with China
foreshadows the end of the unequa l and quasi-dependent relationship
with the United States.

On the one hand this change is wel comed

. . both here and in Japan.

On the other hand, anxieties over what

the future may hold ha\e led to some mutual reer imination .

It is

the respons ibility of diplomacy and statecraft t8 hold in check
tendencies of thjs kind.

On that score, I must say in all candor,

that there has been some slippage on the part of the Administration.
I can conceive of no greater tragedy for the Pacific region
than that the inevitable transition in the U. S. - Japanese relationship terminate in its disruption.

To avoid such an outcome,

..

-

.

---~.~

~---
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- 13 it would be helpful to recognize frankly that Japan's great
economic aChievements in recent years have been pinching at
sensitive political and commercial nerves in this country.

Pre-

,

occupied for too long with Viet Nam, we have awakened to discover
that our industry 1s no longer able to compete in many fields with
the Japanese.

While we have been wasting our substance, skills,

manpower and industrial creativity i n Indochina, the Japanese have
been putting inSignificant outlays into military purposes .

Their

economic energies have been concentrated, instead, on peaceful
production and trade .

It 1s not surprising, in the circumstances,

that for the last s i x years, the Un i ted states has had a bilateral
trade deficit wi th Japan, which reached an all- time high of
$3 . 2 b illion last year.

Japan's reestablishment of relations with China, in my
judgment , is in the interests of all conce r ned .

The door will now

open still more widely to a Sino-Japanese trade which is al re ady
large and growing.

In so doing, it will lessen the pressure of

...
•

- 14 Japanese competition 1n U. S. markets.

Furthermore, it may well

/

stimulate the Soviet Union into a heightened economic i nterchange
with Japan, especially in connection with the Sov iet Maritime
I

•

Provinces and Siberia.

These adjustments can go far to untangle the trade lines of

the Far Pacific which were distorted by ideological conflicts in
the aftermath of World War II.

Moreover, they dovetail with the

clearing away of trade barriers between the United states and China
and the United States and the Soviet Union .

Taken all together,

these shifts could lay a firm economic base for peaceful relationships between Japan, Chlna, the Soviet Union and the United States
in the Western Pacific.

The question is can there also be found

in all four countries the political wit and diplomatic wisdom to build
a quadripartite base of stability in that region?
Early steps will involve adjustments in security relat ion ships, notably in the defense treaties between Japan and the United
States and the Soviet Union and China .

These treaties were entered

. .'

--

-------------------

- 15 into in a different time and s ituation.

Insofar as the Ja panese -

U. S. relationship 1s concerned, it 1s likely that the U. S. nuclear

safeguards for Japan will remain significant for Borne .t ime .

Outside
I

this umbrella, however , it seems to me that U. S. bases on Japanese
territory, which have already declined in importance , will have
lost additional significance as a r esult of the Chou - Tanaka and
the Chou - Nixon communiques .

Present developments among the larger countries of Asia
have set in motion repercuss ions elsewhere .

After two dec"a des of

unrestrained invective , for example, the two Koreas are talking
amicably .

Thailand has accepted a Chinese invitation to take its

table tennis team to Peking.

The ping- pong players will be accom-

panied . by government emissaries carrying not only paddles and
ping- pong balls , but, in all pr obability, briefs on Sino- Thai
international issues .

It will be only a matter of time , I should

think, befor e relations are no r ma1ized between China and Thailand,
Indonesia , the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand .

- 16 In short, from one end of the Western Pacific to the other,
>

outmoded policies are on the way out.

What still remains intact,

however, are this nation's military and other arrangements around
the rim of the People's Republic of China.

,

The next step for this

Administration or its successor, it would seem, will involve an
examination of these arrangements, indeed all the tools--the
treaties and other measures--by which antiquated doctrines are
still being pursued i n Asia.
have to be reset

80

The cutting edge of these tools will

that they may be applied in follow-through on

the President's initiative and wi th relevance to the contemporary
real ities of the Far East.
It would be well to bear in mind in this connection that
the United States is, and will continue to be, a Pacific power .
We should cease now to act as an Asian power as we have been trying
to do for the past quarter of a century.

The fact is that we have

no vital--I stress the word vital--lnterest on the mainland of Asia
except to extr icate ourselves from the quicksands of Indochina.

- 17 To meet our vital Pacific interests --and, as distinct from those
in Asia, they are vital- - does not require us to continue to maintain

"hundreds of thousands of armed forces and over 100 major bases
throughout the Western Pacific at a cost of billions of dollars
annually .

It does not compel us to give vast quantities of arms

and other wasteful aid to dubious governments.

The deployment of

our military forces and our res ources should be matched to contemporary needs and not to the myths of the past .

It 1s time for

careful, in- depth studies of all of our non - nuclear securl·ty

commitments in Asia and it would be my hope that such studies will
be undertaken in the Senate and elsewhere during the next Congress .
Over the hopeful developments in Asia, there still hangs
the cloud of Indochina .
Southeast Asian policies .

Our nation remains entrapped by its own
To be sure, fewer Americans than in the

past now die in Indochina each week and that is cause for gratitude .
That does not excuse us, however, from facing the fundamental issue.
What we must ask ourselves bluntly is why any American should die

'

..
- 18 in Indochina?

Why 1s there, stlll, any American involvement in

a war which 1s now looked upon as a mistake by almost all Americans?
The continued involvement in Indochina wor ks against the
long- range interests of this nation not only in Asia but throughout
the world and at home.

It is debilitating our economy at the rate

of at least some $8 billion a year now, or about $40 out of the
pockets of every man, woman, and child in the nation .

We are

building up public obligations which not only feed inflation but
which will carry well into the 21st Century.

The involvement 1s

helping to destroy the lives of thousands of Indochinese every week
in a war which, less and less, draws distinctions between combatant
and non-combatant, "smart bombs" notwithstanding .

Like a cancer,

the war eats away at the vitality of our national life and the trust
of Americans in each other and in their government.

It is feeding

on the nation ' s soul, stripping away the concern that has made
America, America--a decent concern for the life of all human beings
wherever they may be .

,

,

I

~ .

- 19 The longer we continue in Indochina the more we place
ourselves at a disadvantage in tackling the real problems facing
us in the Pacific .

The waters of that ocean touch the shores of

the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China .
Pacific nations .

We are all

Our fates are interwoven in a complex of common

and divergent interests .

It is going to tax us to the fullest to

deal with that complex in a way which serves the well - being of
this nation .

We can ill afford to approach the new situation in

the Western Pacific with one foot in the trap of Indochina .
We have made a start- -a good start.

We have begun, belatedly,

to face up to the present and to look to the future .

We have a

long way to go but the first step is the longest and the most
difficult.

We can continue with assurance along this path on which

we have entered in Asia, recogni zing that it is but a sector of the
path of brotherhood, mutual understanding and equality for all men
everywhere.

In the end, the goal is the same -- peace, peace for

ourselves and our children and our children's children.

I
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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)
AT THE REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS
THE BROWN PALACE HOTEL, DENVER, COLORADO
OCTOBER 31, 1972, 12 : 00 NOON, M. S . T .

CHINA AND SHIFTING POLICIES IN ASIA

It 1s fashionable these days to make critical appraisals
of the quality of our institutions .

These appraisals of the media,

Congress, the Presidency and whatever, are not to be scorned,

even when we are put out by what may seem to us to be their
invalidity.

In the end, institutions are better off for the sum

total of criticism .

It provides a continuous test of their vitality .

Institutions which react to critiCism, whether it is accepted or
resented, are, at least, live institutions and if they are alive,
there 1s hope that they have or can develop the capacity to serve
the human purposes for which they are intended.

Over a long period of public serVice, I have noticed that
criticism tends to move in waves of greater or lesser amplitude .

.
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This year, it 1s the Presidential electoral process, last-year
the courts or the Congress and before that the press or the
'1..,.,u!
~"... ~ 1
"\ . . o..J
universities. ~If there 1s one certainty underlying the shifting
pulsations, however, it is that national perspectives are also in
continuous flux, enabling adjustments to be made in our system
which preserve ' the nation I s continuity.

It 1s to this phenomenon of shifting perspective, partl cularly as it effects the problem of the Far East that I would
4-'-

like to address myself today.

.L

The past ~year ,(and

-

~h&li"-has ,...been

a period of momentous changes in the whole structure of the nation's
foreign policy.

These changes derive from profound revisions in

the basic assumptions which have guided our national destiny for
a quarter of a century.
friends .

Old enemies have been embraced as new

Old causes have been exposed to new light and in that

light have often revealed the tarnish of obsolescence .
have toppled and crumbled .

Shibboleths

---------------------------------------------------------- 3 Regrettably, these insights have come to us far too
slowly in many cases .

As a nation, we have paid an enormous

price for the delays.

For a host of reasons, for which both my

profession and yours must bear a great deal of blame, our national
perspectives on foreign policy have tended to calcify in certain
situations .

When that has occurred, myth has superceded reality

as the basis for our foreign policies.

The most pervasive of

these myths and, as it turned out, the most damaging, was that
related to the People's Republic of China ,

Two decades ago, a

revolutionary China came t o be seen as a towering dragon, held
on a leash by Moscow, enveloping cringing neighbors in billowing
clouds of smoke and fire.
The myth was born from the total Nationalist collapse
on the Chinese mainland .

As some of you will remember, this up-

heaval produced enormous repercussions on the American political
scene .
China. n

We searched everywhere for the culprits who had "lost
An America which had just 11lost II a monopoly of nuclear

.~

.

,

..

or

- 4 weapons, in part through the operations of international espionage,
could not understand Hlosing China!! except in terms of conspiracy
and betrayal.

Flushed with the omnipotence of our military might

during World War II, it had not yet dawned on us that a nation
of more than 800 million was not ours or anyone else's to win or
lose.
Our response to what had transpired, in China was to
erect a ring of treaties to choke off what was thought to be
China's aggressive designs.

SEATO and the mutual defense treaties

with the Republic of Chi na, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, all
formed segments of the ring.

With these treaties came U. S. bases,

U. S. troops to man the bases, billions of dollars in military

aid, and advisors to show our allies how to use the arms.

It was

as though we were trying to pen the wild dragon with pacts and
programs .

Anyone having the slightest acquaintance with the

made-in Japan super-science fiction which 1s shown on the TV
networks knows that it takes a lot more.

,

-

•

,

..

- 5 Ironically, while we recoiled from a China which we
thought to be reckless, belligerent and powerful, the Chinese
leaders saw themselves as engaged in a bootstrap operation, minding
their own business and beset on all sides by hostility .

China

denounced U. S . defense policies, the U. S. boycott and U. S. support
of Taiwan as extensions of the western World's efforts for 150 years
to dominate and exploit China .
Now, after a long and surly confrontation, the United States
and China have begun the journey to restore normal relations .

To

bring about this change, the President of the United States, himself,
entered the dragon's lair and emerged not only unscathed, but, clearly
reassured, exhilarated and certainly, as the TV coverage revealed,
well-fed.
I applauded the President's initiative at the time and I
have done so many times since .

Its significance is in no way dimin -

ished by the fact that there has not-been- a Tapid or dramatic followup .

Clearly, that was

~ot

the intention of the visit .

~------~~---------------~"--~"~----------~'----~'--~'-_ ___~1.--
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Nevertheres~, ' When President Nixon and Premier Chou touched
glasses in Peking 's Great Hall of the People, waves of subsurface
motion were set in motion in Asia .

The moment marked the beginning

of a new era in our relations with China and the Western Pacific.
The basis for this change, to a large extent, 1s to be found in what
has taken place inside China .
.JL-

l

•

l

«., ,--,
•

Senator Scott and I spent six-teen- da.yB \ in the Chinese

People's Republic 1ast April and May and both of us reached substantlally the same conclusions about what had taken place within
China.
of other

OUr conclusions, moreover, do not differ greatly from those
~Q9~t

American visitors who may have had, a8 did we, some

previous exposure to the old China.
The contrast is extraordinary.

The present system enjoys

general and, perhaps, enthusiastic acceptance.

It does so notwith-

standing the fact that China 1s controlled more clesely than ever before and is far more tightly organized.

It does so notwithstanding

the absence of intellectual and artistic freedom and representative
government in our sense of these terms.

------ 7 It should be borne 1n mind that our values are not those

of the Chinese people .

What appears to be of great relevance to us

may have little meaning on the other side of the Pacific.

What 1s

clearly of significance 1n Ch1na, today , 1s the fact that the present
system provides adequate food, shelter, clothing and simple consumer
good s.

It has led to great advances 1n public cleanliness and order,

1n health care, 1n basic and technical educat1on, 1n transportation,
electrification and the like.

It has developed a diversified national

economy which 1s able to manufacture--and to manufacture eelcly out
of Chinese resources and skl11s--tens of thousands of modern products.
There are Chinese-made automobiles, tractors and electric buses, not
to speak of Chinese-made hydro-electric generators and nuclear devices.
What is of great relevance to the Chinese, too, 1s that
the structure of nat10nal control is manned from top to bottom,
not by a consp1cuous and h1ghly pr1v1leged e11te as 1n the past

...
- 8 but by men and women who work among the people , who dress
like them and live with them .

Conformity there 1s, as there

has always been in China, but it 1s not the conformity induced
by a visible whip.

absence.

Indeed, enforcers were conspicuous by their

II:'===-\ I do not.-th.1.tlk--±--s"a w-more--tharl at! a'nnea person

or two of any kind dur1ng _S,.oOO m:UeB of travel-c1.n -China .

What 1s to be found 1s a general sense of participation

in nation-building .

A bona fide national family 1s emerging ,

with a "one for all and all for one" concept of soc1al and
economic development.

The present system seems to have succeeded

in undergirding the personal pride of the Chinese 1n China.
Chou En-Iai put it, liThe Chinese people can stand up again. "

As never before, China seems
virtually classless.

Btrong~

dynamic~

unified and

As

.-----------------.--------~--------~~--~~~-.-- 9 As this vast uplift has gained in momentum, nations

have

beat~

path to China's door.

for the beginning of rapprochement .

For us, the time was over -r ipe
The fact 1s that, for several

years, hostility between the United States and China hsa been
receding.

Long before the President's visit, this country had

ceased to be, in China'S eyes, an unmitigated ogre.

Our policies

chose to ignore th i s change in Chinese outlook for many years but
actually, the focus of Peking's concern began to shift elsewhere
a decade ago, notably to the Soviet union and to Japan.

Only the

intrusion of the vietnamese involvement concealed the extent of
the shift.
Today, the Soviet Union appears to give greater cause
for anxiety to the Chi nese than does the United States.

That is,

of course, a reversal of the situation of two decades ago.

In

the early days of the People's Republic, historical irritants,
having to do with Soviet encroachments bn the reaches of Chinese
civilization into Central Asia and Manchuria were ignor ed in the

l

.
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light of what seemed to be ideological solidarity.

The communist

bond between the two nations, moreover, was reinforced by the

unifying impact of the hostility which was directed at both
countries from the Un i ted States and other nations.
Differences in ideology have since come to light between
China and the Soviet Union.

wounds of history.

Border clashes have agaln opened the

The one -million Sovi et troops and allied

Mongolian forces along the inner Chinese border are now regarded

...

~

as &t-ieast

as ~menaclng &6 ~e rlCan

military installations on

Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines or other p-laces in the Pacific or

the prospect of a re-armed Japan .
If the

~ecent

visits of President Nixon and the Congres-

,

s10na1 leadership signa].J-' the official end of the "cold war" in
Asia, the successful mission of Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan to
Peking confirms it.

In turn, Sino-Japanese r approchement foreshadows

the further erosion of the special United states relationship with
Japan which has existed since World War II.

•

--------------~--------------------------,..------------------~--,,~
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The passing of the era of this special relationship,
1n my judgment, 1s all to the good.

The fact is that for a quarter

of a century Japan has depended on the United States not only for
security but also for economic well-being .
has been costly .

For us, the arrangement

For the Japanese, the sense of inferiority which

it has implied has become increasingly intolerable, as the ex-

periences of World War II have receded into the past and Japan has
risen to the level of the third economic power of the world.
Premier Tanaka's initiative towards China opens up
more than new possibilities for Japanese trade.

It also uncovers

a potential for new and constructive political relationships with
other nations in Asia.

In due course, Japan ' s rapprochement with

China is likely to have significant impact on the U. S. -Japanese
mutual defense
security relationship since it alters the basic rationale of the/
treaty .

Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more extensive erosion of

a premise than that which has swept away the assumptions on which
the treaty was based two decades ago .

Those assumptions saw an

aggressive China restrained from pouncing on Japan at the behest

- 12 -

of an aggressive Soviet Union only by grace of the interposition
of U. S. military might .

So complete has been the reversal of

these assumptions that the President has been able to visit in
one year, both Peking and Moscow and receive in both capitals a
most cordial welcome .

And so, too, have the Japanese leaders.

What the comings and goings of heads - of- states indicate

is that the dikes of post World War II relationships have given
way in Asia .

Erosive tides are at work on the existing alignments

among the large natlons--Chlna, Japan, the Soviet Union and the

United States.

They are also being felt among the smal l er nations .

After two decades of hurling invective at each other, for example,
the two Koreas are talking of stabilization of the situat10n on the
Korean peninsula.

Lying as it does in the triangle between China,

the Soviet Union, and Japan, that stabilization is essential to a
durable peace in Asia.

It is a key to political balance at the

Northeast Asian corner of the ASian mainland in a way similar to
that of Indochina in Southeast Asia .

A solution to the Korean

.'
f

- 13 question on the basis of unification and neutralization is
likely to lie a long way in the fut ure but at least the signs
of a beginning are in the air.

,

As for Thailand, it has followed the American lead ~and
, ,
~ fj,.... f
I<
I
accepted a l Chinese invitation to take its table tennis team to
Pek1Rg.

There is renewed dialogue between Indonesia and China .

In all probab1lity, it is only a matter of time before Thailand,
Indonesia, )--the Phl11ppines-, MalayS'ia,

Aue~ral!a

and New ZealaAd

follow the U. S. lead in restorin g political contact with China.
In sum, the leaves of past policies, myths and mistakes
are scurrying into history.
in Asia .

A new era has already begun to emerge

Still intact, however, is the ring of anti-Chinese

treaties which was put together two decades ago by the United
States.

Robbed of a militant China to check, these treaties are

now more shadow than substance.

Yet, they cost us enormously out

of our resources and will continue to do so for as long as they
remain in their present form.

_I~

~ ----------~.--------------------------------------------------------------~-;,.t----

- 14 The fact 1s that the United States has no vital interests
on the Asian continent which warrant the kind of massive commitment
of men and material that we have witnessed in Indochina and elsewhere in Asia during the past decade.
That is not to say that the United states is not a
Pacific power.

As distinct from the Asian mainland, we do have

vital interests i n what transpires in the Pacific Ocean.

To safe-

guard these interests in present circumstances, however, does not
require us to mainta i n hundreds of thousands of forces and over a
hundred major military bases in and around the rim of Asia at a
cost of billions of dol l ars annually.

Commitments to join in the

defense of this region against aggression does not require us to
garrison various countries wi th U. S. troops or to deluge them
with vast quantities of costly arms and assistance.
Treaties and agreements and aid-programs are not chiseled
into stone.

Like any other aspect of a nation's policies, they

must be kept current if the public interest is to be served.
Insofar as Asia is involved, we should match our commitments,

----------.~.----------------------------.-.----------------~.----~,~'-,-,----.-,------
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deployment of military forces and expenditur es of r esour ces to
today's realities and not 1n conformity with the myths of the
past.

This pr inciple certainly applies to the Japanese - U. S .

Security Treaty, the Korean Treaty, to SEATO and to the various
costly aid - programs and defense arrangements to which they have

given rise .
r~ga r dless

It would be my hope that the--n-ext-Adm-tn1.strat1.on--'
of its political

""

,

j..(,'

H:.J,..L.-

complexlon~- wl11 move~ promptly ~ to

{.

make necessary adjustments.

Certainly, the change 1n attitude

towards China, on the part of both the United States and Japan
has opened up substantial possibilities 1n this connection .
Over shadowing the hopeful developments 1n Asia of
the last year there hang

the war in Indochina.

which seems to feed on itself .

t generates its own momentum,

increasingly unrelated to any conceiva
nation .
.

ou~

e

It 1s war whose continuance, indeed,

interests .

It is a war

interest of this
o~

violence to

- 16 /

Yet, we · rema1n entrapped by our own

our

rhetor1C~

own inertia, perhaps, by our own emphasis o.n "savin/ race,

a

II

lUxury which once was assumed to be exclusively an oriental
prerogative .

i

Whatever the case, the war drags on.- The forms of

U. S. engagement change and

BO,

too, does the rationale of engagement .

But our deep and costly involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland
seems to go on forever.
My sentiments regarding this situation, I am sure, have

been known to all of you for many years.

I continue to hope that

before, on, or immediately after the election--the sooner the better;we will bring to an end this deadly travesty .

That we should have

done so years ago makes the urgency no less compelling.
For a decade, we have pursued a war in which we became
involved because of the calcification of our policies towards China .
Those policies lost whatever basis they may have had years ago.
Thanks to the President, we have broken out of their ancient grip .

- 17 Is it not time now that we also recognized that a hideous derivative
of those policies, the military involvement 1n Indochina, 1s even more
invalid?

If the old China policy was wrong, how can our continued

immersion 1n Viet Nam possibly be right?
The horror of unnecessary deaths and injuries, inflicted on
Americans, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians 1s bad enough.

But,

that is not the end of the price which i. being paid for persistance
1n this abomination .

Nor does the price end 1n terms of the immense

burdens which the war laces on the nation I B economy or 1n the dlvls1veneSB which the war injects, 85 a deadly drug, into the inner unity of
this nation .

The war also continues to distort international relation-

ships in the Western Pacific and inhibits our capacity to make timely
adjustments in our approach to that region .
Critical questions of policy 1n the western Pacific lie
beyond Viet Nam; they lie beyond Cambodia and beyond Laos.

These

remote rice-cultures of Southeast Asia will some day return to the
obscurity which they once enjoyed.

The challenge of foreign policy

1n Asia is in the building of a new foundation for peace in the
western Paciflc ~

,

,

. r

,
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'I

If we are to contribute effectively to that high purpose,.

,I

/

it is imperative

forthwi~'

1

,

--that we end our military involvement in Indochina

I

,,

1
1

. --that we adjust downward our direct military involvement in the Western Pacific to correspond to the changed political
situation,
--that we begin now to pursue a diplomacy seeking , in
time, to establish a quadripartite base of China, Japan, the Soviet
Uni on and the United states on which to build the peace and
stability of the region.
,

To be able to do what must be done for the future of
this nation in the Pacific:

--We must concentrate on making American products comr

petitive in world markets once more, and forego the
walls of

monetary~

1

bul1dl~g

of

trade isolationism around ourselves;

--We must cease wasting our national substance and our

"

h.

.. -

- 19 energy on irrelevant military adventures and questionable client
governments in Asia;
--We must redouble our efforts to establish a durable
I

framework of understanding with all Asian nations, through more
effective use of the whole range of information media, through
candor and courage in our official appraisals and through cultural
exchanges with all the nations of Asia.
The waters of the Pacific break on the shores of the
United States, the Soviet union, Japan, and China.

We are all

Pacific powers with common interests in the possibilities of
peaceful relations in the region.

The cold war is over in Asia.

May we find the wisdom, now, to match our policies to the opportunities which the new situation presents.

In so doing, we will

be able to turn our energies and our efforts once again to building
peace in the Pacific and in the world, for ourselves, our children
and our children's children.

I
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